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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of TVET schooling of Ethiopian urban youth on their
employability using the Urban Employment and Unemployment Survey (UEUS). In es-
timating the personal returns of TVET experience, we put special focus on family back-
ground of workers, with the hypothesis that family characteristics strongly influence on
the employability of workers. We find general positive effects of TVET on employability in
benchmark regressions as well as sample selection model. However once we controlled en-
dogeneity of TVET choice and family background, the TVET positive effect disappeared.
The results suggest the possibility that public vocational school is viewed and chosen as
a last resort of education or alternative to general education, especially for those who
were denied to proceed to further education, failed to enter upper secondary schools, and
females, but only if they are financially fit.
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1 Introduction
Development of manufacturing sector is one of the promising paths for stable growth of Africa.
This is especially true when we look at the countries where primary commodities account for a
large part of GDP and export earnings, and their high dependence on primary export retards
long-term economic growth and fostering of stable society (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Ross
2012). Weak manufacturing sector in African countries is associated with insignificant sectoral
labor shift from agriculture to manufacturing (McMillan et al 2014) , and the shortage of in-
dustrial skilled workers is critical. Recent discussions on technical and vocational education
and training (TVET) among the international development society reflects this understanding,
which seems to have lead to TVET system reforms in several African countries.
This study attempts to evaluate the impacts of TVET schooling on urban youth in Ethiopia,
based on the national labor force survey, Urban Employed and Unemployed Survey (UEUS)
2006, 2009-2015. Ethiopia has still small but growing manufacturing sector. Given the high
share of youth in the population as well as the high unemployment ratio especially among
youth, development of manufacturing industry as a mass absorber of workforce is critical.
While the reform has been underway almost for a decade, evaluation of the Ethiopian TVET
system is not enough, both in government and academic researches. In some of the other less-
developed countries, the impact of vocational training programs or projects on youth for limited
time period have been studied, applying randomized control trials (for example, Hamory et al.
2015 on Kenya, Blattman et al. 2014 on Uganda, Bandiera et al. 2012 on Uganda, Cho et
al. 2013 on Malawi, and Card et al. 2011 on Dominica). Results are mixed; some reported
positive impact, while others showed impacts only for female or even negative. Many of those
are one-time, relatively short period, poor or minority oriented vocational programs. On the
other hand, when vocational training system is planned and designed in close connection to
national industrial policy, vocational education becomes an important part of formal educa-
tion system. The significant role of vocational education as a formal system for development
of a society is obvious, given the long experiences in industrial countries. However, in terms
of cost efficiency, especially for developing countries, there is long lasting debates on TVET
(Psacharopoulos 1987, King 1993, Oketch 2007, Joshi and Verspoor 2013).
In this paper we focus on the effect of TVET in Ethiopia as an institutional education, a
part of formal education system. Our main research question is the impact of lower level TVET
on workers. However, we are not assessing the meaning of training or effectiveness of what is
taught. Rather, we simply focus on the effect of TVET on employability, weighting on the two
points. First, we ask whether family has effect on employability of worker, by controlling the
family background, whereby we treat school difference as exogenous. Second, we treat school
difference and choice of TVET as endogenous. The second point is based on the assumption
that in Ethiopia where opportunities for higher general education is limited, as other African
countries (Oketch (2007), those who lost chance to proceed to upper secondary may see TVET
as the last opportunity of additional education, regardless of lower social perception of TVET.
While not many empirical researches on Ethiopian TVET exist, Franklin (2015) analyzes
on job search of Ethiopian youth, using randomized trial, with special focus on the cost of job
search, and suggests that the monetary cost, such as transportation fees, is the bottleneck for
youth job searchers. This indicates that economic background and availability of financial sup-
port matter to chances for youth to find a job. Apart from randomized trial, several researches
on Ethiopian youth also suggest existence of labor market segmentation between the wealthy
and the poor. Serneels (2007) focuses on youth male job preference of public job over private
or lower status job, and concludes that the riches tend to wait for government jobs, resulting
longer unemployment period.This point has been mentioned by Krishnan (1996), and Mains
(2012) supports this view through anthropological work. Mains (2012) especially describes the
existence of reluctance, or a kind of “stigma” towards manual works among urban youth, which
often are strong enough to make them prefer to stay unemployed rather than taking low status
jobs.
In using secondary data, we take advantage of relatively large sample size on one hand, but
we also face several limitations. Those limitations mainly stem from the structure and charac-
teristics of the survey. One of the two major limitations is that we observe family information
of workers only if the one is living with family. This is quite a serious limitation, since as
the literature in educational and labor economics suggest, family background such as parents’
education or wealth (income or asset) strongly influences the unobserved trait of workers, abil-
ity, or cognitive skills of workers (Acemoglu and Pischke 2001, Rees and Gray 1982, McElroy
and Horney 1981, Shea 2000, Krishnan 1996, Heckman and Hotz 1986). Limiting the sample
to those with family information will lead to biased estimation if unobserved determinant is
correlated both with family membership, that is, whether a worker is living with parents is not,
and employment status. We will test this point with sample selection model. The other major
limitation is that we observe information of workers’ payment only for limited workers, in not
strictly systematic manner. This limitation requires us to develop new indicators, which are
also not flawless.
In next section, we briefly discuss on the situation of education and work especially for
urban youth in Ethiopia. Section 3 elaborates on the data and our devices to circumvent the
data limitation before we move on to analytical framework which will be discussed in section
4. We then empirically test our assumption in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Education and society in Ethiopia
According to the Ministry of Education, net enrollment ratio at upper primary education (grade
8) is 49.5%, which reduces to 20.2% for lower secondary (year 2013/14), suggesting that almost
half of the recent school age youth stop before grade 8 (MOE 2015). Given the fact that most
common educational path is to finish up to 8th grade, those who proceed to secondary and
tertiary education should have some distinguished features with themselves or their families.
Unfortunately, the official statistics on TVET enrollment is unreliable for obvious misreporting
and underreporting in recent years, but TVET schools and enrollment are on the increasing
trend since around 2000.
The Ethiopian government runs national five-year plans specifically for education sector,
the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP). As a result of this implementation, the
number of TVET schools in Ethiopia increased by fourfold, and the number of students tripled
between 2004 and 2011 (Shimazu 2014). Current ESDP V, which covers 2015/16-2019/20 (ac-
cording to Ethiopian calender), also refers to TVET as a priority program along with other
educations (MOE 2015), which parallels with the national Growth and Transformation Plan
(GTP). Fostering of manufacturing sector has been set as one of the keys for development
through GTP I (2010/11-2014/15) and newly announced GTP II (2015/16-2019/20, National
Planning Commission 2016). The GTP II maintains policy focus on strengthening of TVET
to foster skilled workers. The GTP II also refers to the future investment in TVET, to further
increase the numbers of TVET institutions and graduates (ibid. 186-187). On the other hand,
Bigsten et al (2013) suggest the recent increase of non-public and informal jobs in Ethiopia.
While TVET education is aimed to supply skilled workers into industries as employee, current
educational policy also aims at the promotion of self-employment among TVET graduates.
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Under current policy on TVET which defines it as the post-lower secondary education, the
government stipulates that the ratio of the students finishing TVET level 1-2, 3-4, 5 are de-
signed to be 24:3:1 (Shimazu 2014, 69). Given this fact, we focus on the return of lower TVET,
level 1 and 2, which make up the majority of TVET graduates. Our motivation for focusing
on TVET 1 and 2 also stems from our experience in the interviews in Addis Ababa, Oromia,
and SNNPR that not a few employers referred to the point that TVET graduates are equipped
with favorable knowledge and training experience as employee in their industry, but only if
they finished above level 3. If this view represents the general perception on the graduates of
TVET, it worth testing its influence on the majority, lower level TVET graduates’ economic
outcome.
[Table 1]
2.1 Family membership
Table 1 shows the family membership of those who are economically active, by final educational
record. We use the term “family membership” to denotes the situation where youth are living
with their parents’ family after finishing education. If one is household head or the spouse, or
in the household as non-relative, we define the one is out of family membership. It is clear from
the table that family membership is highest among those who finished lower secondary school,
TVET, and upper secondary schools.
There are several possible reasons why youth still living with family after finishing educa-
tion. Aside from high living cost in urban centers like Addis Ababa, other possibility is that the
youth is preparing for next educational step, though those are defined as economically inactive
in our analysis and excluded. The other possible reason is the financial. Youth without work, or
low earning may choose to live with parents’ family. McElroy and Horney (1981) suggest that
family membership has a function as unemployment security for youth. While their analysis
was based on the United States, the function of family membership as unemployment security is
also applicable in the context of less-developed countries such as Ethiopia, where social security
system such as unemployment insurance is still to come.
Unlike the United Stats, a point specific to Ethiopia or other developing economies is that
majority of households do not have economic capacity to keep youth in the same household
after finishing education. In Table 1, the lower the educational record, the lower the possibility
to be living with parents. Only relative rich families are capable to serve as unemployment
insurance for their family members.
[Table 2]
2.2 Labor market segmentation
Table 2 shows the unemployment ratio by education level. We see that the ratio is highest
among those who finished the lower secondary education (secondary 1). This raises following
two points, which leads to the question that whether there is segmentation within the labor
market.
First, higher unemployment ratio in relatively high education level indicates a possibility
that the type of jobs sought are different, depending on their educational background. Kr-
ishnan et al (1998), Serneels (2007), and Bisgsten et al (2013) suggest that until recently the
government have been the main provider of works in Ethiopia, and government jobs meant
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high social status. If it is the case today, the segmentation can be between the government
jobs which are rationed and need to be waited, and the private jobs which are less rationed but
with lower social status and stability. As suggest by Bigsten et al (2013), with recent economic
changes there are increasing number of private jobs in the economy today, and the share of
younger workers employed in private sector is increasing. This new trend should have pushed
up the status of private sector job, though the preference toward white color or office job still
exist.
Second, if labor market is segmented according to educational attainment, the segmentation
should have deeper root in social and economic stratification, which resulted in the differences
in educational record. The analyses on the intergenerational transmitting effect through family
wealth and parents’ ability suggest that parents’ income and education influence on child’s
schooling or earnings. In analyses on United States, Shea (2000) shows that father income
influences on child’s human capital if father’s educational attainment is low. Acemoglue and
Pischke (2001) on the other hand show that family income influences on child’s college enroll-
ment. Obviously due to data limitation, not many of this type of analysis have been done in
lower-income countries, but Heckman and Hotz (1986) discuss labor market segmentation and
social stratification in Panama, and show that education of parents influences male household
heads’ earnings. On Ethiopia, Krishnan (1996) examined on age 15-29 urban worker, and sug-
gested that parents’ earnings influence on children if they are working in public sector.
In the following, we also assume that family background influences young workers, and see
whether those who have chosen to go to TVET are different from their peers, and whether those
who are living with parents are different. Our another working hypothesis is that not all the
youth entered TVET are vocation-oriented, and we test the possibility that choice of TVET as
a reflection of high aspiration for additional educational attainment. This point should not be
peculiar, given the rigid educational system in Ethiopia, where demand for education is increas-
ing and number of youth is also increasing, leading to severe school-record based competitions
in job market.
The following sections show that there is segmentation of education class, which leads to
segmentation of labor. This is especially relevant in current Ethiopia, where educational system
is still experiencing transitions, and still the access to higher education is limited. In the mean
time, educational attainment is rapidly increasing in urban areas, while the income gap and
opportunity gap is widening given the recent rapid growth and increasing number of youth in
the society.
3 Theoretical framework
We assume that there is segmentation of labor market for ones who prefer to be employed in
bad job rather than stay unemployed, and for ones who prefer to stay unemployed rather than
taking a bad job. Segmentation of job and workers is discussed by Heckman and Hotz (1986),
and Acemoglu (2001) on directed search in labor market where two types of jobs exist. We
also assume two types of job, good job and bad job, where the payments are denoted as wg
and wb respectively, and 0 < wb < wg. In parallel with the empirical analysis in next section,
we assume good job is formal employment, private or public, as paid employee, and bad job is
self-employment. If one is economically active but unemployed, or working but unpaid so that
payment w0 = 0, we regard the situation unemployed.
4
Following Serneels (2007), we assume present value for a worker with each type of job as
V i =
∞∑
t=1
δtwi =
wi
1− δ , (1)
where i = u, b, g.
For simplicity, we assume that V b < V g always holds. We also assume that there is no
entry-cost for self-employment or a bad job, and that bad job is always available. A good job
is allocated with possibility α, 0 < α < 1 to a worker, and one will take a bad job regardless of
the possibility of getting a good job as long as
V = max(V u − V b, 0) = 0. (2)
We define the expected value of an employed as
W (w) = E[αwg + (1− α)wb]. (3)
On the other hand, the present value of an unemployed is defined as
V u = U = δ{max(V u − V b, 0)B + E[W (w)] (4)
where B denotes benefit received during unemployment, or family support in Ethiopian context,
where social security system such as unemployment insurance is still not fully established. Thus,
for the worker with V u − V b > 0,
U = (V u − V b)B + δE[W (w)], (5)
and for the worker with V u − V b ≤ 0
U = δE[W (w)]. (6)
Since a worker is indifferent to staying unemployed or being employed at reservation wage
WR, we obtain reservation wage when expected value of employed equals to present value of
unemployed. Thus, for the worker with V u − V b > 0 ,
WR =
(V u − V b)B
1− δ (7)
and for the worker with V u − V b ≤ 0
WR = 0. (8)
This model reflects our assumption that a worker who takes any available job should have
very low reservation wage, with no external financial support or family to rely on. On the other
hand, those who can get support from family, the reservation wage must be high enough so that
they can chose to stay unemployed rather than taking a bad job. In the next section we extend
this idea to empirical model, where we test the effect of family support B on employment status.
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4 Data
The UEUS has been conducted by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency from 2003, as one
of the survey which complement with the National Labor Force Surveys. The report of the first
UEUS survey states that it was a “bi-annual” survey program to be conducted in October and
April, and conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2006 (CSA 2004). However, through system changes
since 2006 it became annual survey, though the survey round was resumed only first in 2009
after 2006 (CSA2006; 2009). The survey is conducted annually after 2009. We use the date
from the round of 2006, and from 2009 to 2015 except for 2013 when it was conducted under the
name of Labor Force Survey (LFS). Since large part of the questions in LFS are compatible with
UEUS, we integrated the data1. The sampling is stratified based on the Enumeration Areas
defined by the government, so the number of chosen households and composition is compatible
all through the survey, though the households are not identical, making a pooled data. Since
our focus is on youth, we limit the sample to age between 17 and 35, setting lower boundary at
17 as we wish to include those who have finished lower TVET and comparable education and
started working, and upper boundary at 35 according to the definition of youth by the African
Youth Charter (African Union Commission 2006). We also limit our sample to male and female
who are economically active, that is, not in education, ill or pregnant, or not out of work for
any other given reason. Some of the studies on youth unemployment such as Serneels (2007)
focus on youth males, but here we keep female in our samples to see the effect of education
on different sex. The difference is an important when looking at TVET schools, since it has
achieved equal gender enrollment ratio in lower levels. This contrasts to other tertiary level
schools, where male enrollment still dominates.
[Table 3]
In order to look at the family influence, we defined family (=family membership dummy)
and other three variables, family earning, family TVET and family education. These variables
are calculated using scores for employment status, TVET experience and educational record
for each family member (excluding non-relatives) in the same household. Summary statistics
is shown in Table3, and all mean difference by family membership is statistically significant at
1% level. Detailed definitions are given in Appendix. A limitation of our data set is that we
observe family background information on parents, siblings or siblings of parents only if the
worker is living within the same household. That is, if the worker is married and established
independent household, or living alone, we do not observe their parents’ family background.
Moreover, given our assumption on the social segmentation, the family membership can be
endogenously determined. For instance, rich parents with land and house may be able to accept
their children in the household and support their livings even after they finish education and
have positive incomes on their own. Conversely, youth with rich family may have been in good
learning environment, which may have resulted in better education and higher earning, enabling
to establish own independent household. We need to deal family background information as
endogenous explanatory variable, where whether the information is observable endogenously
depends on the other determinants. We deal with this point with the empirical estimation
method.
Regrading the dependent variable, our main focus is employment status. In general, analy-
ses on economic return of education in developed countries use wage data to measure the status.
However, the UEUS collects weekly payment data only for those who are formally employed
1While UEUS covers only urban areas, LFS sample also covers rural areas. We used only the urban samples.
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as paid worker, but the survey does not collect information of payment for those who work as
self-employed. To circumvent this limitation and to enable those without payment information
to be included in sample, we generated new indicators to describe the ordered employment
status by categorizing jobs, by applying the concept of good jobs and bad jobs. We define good
job as being employed as paid employee, public or private (with payment information), bad job
as self-employed (without payment information), and unemployed as economically active but
not employed or self-employed. Summary statistics is reported in Table 4. One catch here is
that there is no clue to distinguish the cases such as when one is informal and self-employed
but actually earning more than poorly paid public workers. Such cases should not be rare in
a rapidly changing economy such as Ethiopia, but we proceed to empirical analysis with this
categorization, assuming that paid-employee is preferred in general and thus regarded at least
as better job, given high status value and image attached by the society.
[Table 4]
In estimating the employability of workers who finished lower TVET levels, we need com-
parable group of workers whose quality as a worker is similar but with different educational
history. On this point, we utilize the structure of educational system. In Ethiopia, only those
who passed a threshold in the national examination (Primary School Leaving Certificate Ex-
amination: PSLCE) can proceed to Secondary school. On the other hand, entrance to upper
secondary school is screened by the national examination (Ethiopian General Secondary Ed-
ucation Certificate Examination: EGSECE), and it seems to be rare that one choose TVET
despite passing that exam. Based on this system, we assume that cognitive skill level is similar
between those who finish Lower Secondary and TVET school. We also assume that those who
finish upper secondary schools have higher cognitive skills than their peer, though the average
ability as worker should not far apart from TVET graduates. In the meantime, if academic
ability reflected in the test scores is further reflected in employability of a worker, upper sec-
ondary school graduates should have advantage over TVET school graduates. Additionally,
having graduated upper secondary should send strong signal as a good quality worker in labor
market. In the same manner, being a TVET graduate should clearly signals as lower quality
worker vis-a`-vis upper secondary school graduates, if employers view cognitive skills and the
record of general education as the reflection of worker’s ability. If any meaningful deviation
exists between the results of signaling based on academic ability and actual economic returns,
that should be interpreted as the result of market’s appreciation for TVET schooling in terms
of the skills attained through training, or other ability such as better attitudes toward work.
[Table 5]
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Base regression
Before proceeding to the regressions of main interest, we run regressions on family membership,
to see whether our working hypothesis is on the right track. Table5 shows the regression results
of family membership of youth on available information. We confirm that the possibility to
be living with parents’ family is highest among those with secondary to tertiary educational
record, in Addis Ababa, and unemployed. Not surprisingly, family membership decreases as
age goes up. We can also read that female youth are less likely to be living with family except
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for those with high educational record.
We first run benchmark regressions without controlling any possible biases. Table 6 and
Table 7 shows the results of probit regressions, where dependent are binary variables taking
the each job status, unemployed; bad job; good job. We built two different sub samples for
comparison purpose; first group consists of youth workers who finished either lower secondary
school or TVET level 1 and 2, and second group consists of those who finished either TVET
level 1 and 2 or upper secondary school. In this base regressions, TVET has no effect on
unemployment, but TVET graduates are less likely to be in bad job, and more likely to be
in good job in both subgroups. This result should not be surprising in comparison with lower
secondary graduates, since having finished TVET clearly indicates the record of additional
education and training. On the other hand, it is rather striking that TVET graduates enjoy
better employability when compared with upper secondary. It is noteworthy that in both
subsamples, the cross term of female and TVET is negative on unemployed and positive on
good job, suggesting general positive influence of TVET on female employability. We also
included family. The Coefficients appear with positive sign in the regression on unemployed
in both subgroups, suggesting that workers living with their parents’ are more likely to be
unemployed. Additionally, we also included family earning. From Table 3, family earning
tends to be higher if youth is living with parents and working siblings. Regression results show
that the higher the family earnings, the more likely the worker to stay unemployed. However,
if we separate the sample into those who is living with parents and in independent household,
the effect of family earnings is in fact opposite. For those who living with parents, family
earnings works to reduce the possibility to stay unemployed, while for those in independent
household, family earnings increases the possibility to be unemployed. While we should wait
further regressions before interpreting the meaning of family earnings, this at least suggests
that the family’s function as a support for unemployed is different in parents’ and own.
[Table 6]
[Table 7]
5.2 Family membership as sample selection
Based on the benchmark regressions, we first test the possibility of sample selection. We assume
that family information such as earning and education is endogenous, in that they are correlated
with other unobserved information, which also determines family membership. To deal with
sample selection, we employ a selection model based on Wooldrige (2010), where we treat family
earnings as endogenous explanatory variable.
We think about a model consists of three equations as below.
y1 = x1δ1 + y2α1 + u1 (9)
y2 = x2δ2 + u2 (10)
y3 = 1[xδ3 + u3 > 0], (11)
where y1 is binary job status, x1 is a vector of control variables such as female dummy, age,
region and education (TVET), y2 is endogenous family earning which is observed only if the
worker is living with family. x2 is exogenous variables including x1, family education, and
marital status, where the last two variables serve as exclusion restrictions. y2 is binary fam-
ily membership dummy (family), and and thus y2 is only observed when y3 = 1. z denotes
exogenous variables and includes x1, and others which serve as instruments, and u1, u2 and
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u3 are the error terms. We first regressed equation (11) and obtained the Inverse Mill’s Ratio
(IMR), which is used as one of the instruments, along with female household head dummy
(feHHH ) number of siblings (n siblings). The second and third steps of regressions (equation
9 and 10) are estimated with IV probit, but linear two stage regression results are also reported.
The results are shown in Table8 and Table9. In both subgroup, the final results are similar
to the benchmark results. TVET schooling has no influence on unemployment, but workers
finished TVET are less likely to be self-employed, and more likely to be in good job, even after
controlling the family membership as sample selection and endogenity of family earning. The
instrumented family earning is not statistically significant in regressions on unemployment and
bad job, but positive and significant (5% level) in regression on good job in lower secondary
and TVET subsample, suggesting that the higher the family earning, the higher the possibility
to be in good job. On the other hand, the coefficient of family earning is negative and signifi-
cant (5% level) in regression on good job in TVET and upper secondary subsample. However,
given the fact that the coefficients of IMRs obtained from the first step regression and used as
an instrument in the second step is statistically significant but close to zero, sample selection
bias of family membership does not appear to be significant, though it can be suggesting the
weakness of instruments.
[Table 8]
Having checked the weak sample selection, we run two step regressions without sample se-
lection, by instrumenting family earning using other family information regardless of family
membership. The results are shown in Table10 and Table11. While the results seems to be
very similar to the regressions above, one important difference is that the coefficients of the
instrumented family earnings are all statistically significant in both subgroups, and except for
(3) and (4) in the second subgroup. The sign is positive in the regressions on unemployed, sug-
gesting the existence of family support increases the possibility that a youth stays unemployed.
On the other hand, in the regressions on good job, the signs are negative. In fact, the sign of
family earnings on good job is not consistent through models so far, thus we cannot see clear
effects of family support on getting a good job. To check further on this point, we now focus
on the possibility that choice of TVET is also biased.
In the models above, we have treated educational choice as exogenous, and family earning
as endogenous. However, parents’ background such as education, occupation or social status
should have influenced not only on family’s economic capacity but also children’s educational
choice.
[Table 9]
[Table 10]
[Table 11]
5.3 Endogenous educational choice
Given the results above, now we assume that educational choice was influenced by family back-
ground, and thus treat TVET dummy as endogenous. Given the binary endogenous variable,
here we apply bivariate probit model as below.
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y1 = 1[z1δ1 + α1y2 + ν1 > 0] (12)
y2 = 1[zδ2 + ν2 > 0], (13)
where y1 is binary employment status, and y2 is TVET dummy. z1 and z are exogenous
variables. Here we treat family earnings and other variables related to family information (re-
gardless of parents’ or own family) as exogenous, along with region dummies, age and female
dummy.
Table12 shows the regression results. Under the assumption of endogenous educational
choice and exogenous family earnings, TVET schooling totally changes its impacts on employ-
ability. In comparison with lower secondary, TVET graduates are more likely to be unemployed,
and less likely to be in good job. Regrading the TVET effects on female, the cross terms with
female dummy suggest TVET has positive effect on female employability, though the effect
is not large enough to offset the inferior situation in employment. Family earning coefficient
appears with positive sign in regression on unemployment, suggesting possibility to stay unem-
ployed increase when family support is available. On the other hand, from the regressions on
TVET, it is noteworthy that a worker in family with higher earnings and educational records
tend to have chosen TVET, and those who have family member who went to TVET are more
likely to have chosen TVET. Similarly, in comparison with upper secondary, TVET graduates
are more likely to be unemployed, and less likely to be in good job. The regressions on TVET
suggest that TVET are chosen by the workers with lower family educational records but higher
family earnings. In both subgroups, females are more likely to have chosen TVET, reflecting
the equal gender ratio in TVET schools, especially in lower levels.
[Table 12]
6 Conclusion
We have tested the impacts of TVET on employability of youth in urban Ethiopia. We first
assumed existence of difference between those who living with parents’ family and not, whereby
we treated education as exogenous. In those regressions the effect of TVET on employability
was found positive in general, though our view that there is labor market segmentation between
those living with family and independent, and thus, between with parents’ family support and
without, was not denied, but the difference turned out to be not significant. This result may
be due to the fact that we limited the sample to those who are economically active youth and
those with educational record between lower secondary and upper secondary. Those youth may
be already the “selected,” in Ethiopian society, that is, wealthy enough to enjoy good learning
environment and allowed to stay in education without dropping out from school for living.
If this was the case, it was unlikely to find a strong sample selection bias by current family
membership.
Under our second hypothesis on endogenous educational choice, where we assumed that the
segmentation has already started at school choice, we found positive effect of TVET phased
out after controlling endogeneity of school choice and other family information. Compared to
the benchmark results, this suggests that positive TVET effect comes from the specificity of
workers who have chosen to go to TVET, such as strong aspiration and high motivation, as
well as existence of financial support in job search. The results further imply the possibility
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that TVET is seen as the last resort of educational path for those who was denied to proceed
to further education, especially those who failed to enter upper secondary schools and females,
but only if they are financially fit. These result must be reflecting the social background in
Ethiopia, where there are only limited opportunities and alternatives for post lower-secondary
education. As the number of youth increases and competition for wealth grows intense, ed-
ucation should be becoming a must to survive the competition.One of the limitations of this
analysis, along with lack of several important information, is that we do not have information
on the financial cost of schooling in each level. Controlling the schooling cost will be the task
for in future study.
As reviewed in the beginning section, TVET in Ehiopia has been promoted under the na-
tional growth policy, and its objective is to increase the supply of skilled workers into industries.
Our analysis suggest, however, the possibility that those who enter to TVET schools may not
be industry oriented. Obviously, our analysis does not offer a discussion basis on the efficacy of
public vocational schools. It is a fact that TVET graduates are enjoying better employability,
while it does not necessarily mean the effect of vocational training. What we tested is rather a
possible meaning of TVET vis-a`-vis conventional education. The results imply the demand for
educational chances, where TVET may be viewed as an last chance of education for youth in a
society which is rapidly changing, and the educational aspiration and attainment is increasing.
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A Definition of family information variables
• family earning: Employment status of each family member is evaluated by a score, and
summed up for each household except for non-relatives within the household and the
worker self, and divided by the family size. Scores are defined as 1=unemployed; 2=in-
formal self-employed; 3=formal self-employed; 4=informal paid-employee; 5=formal paid-
employee. Economically dependent are attached score=0.
• family TVET : TVET score=1 is attached to family members if finished TVET and oth-
erwise zero, regardless of age, and summed up for each household except for non-relatives
within the household and the worker self.
• family edu: Education record (“highest education attained”) of each family member is
evaluated by score. The categorization of education is basically according to UEUS,
though adjusted by author for the changes in questions through survey years. Scores are
defines as 0=not answered; 1=literacy; 2=lower primary; 3=upper primary; 4=lower sec-
ondary; 5=TVET 1&2; 6=upper secondary; 7=diploma or TVET 3; 8=bachelor, TVET
4, and above. Family education score is calculated by summing up for each member
education score except for non-relatives within the household and the worker self, and
divided by the family size.
12
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Table 1: Education and family membership
family membership
0 1 Total
not answered 81.60 18.40 100.00
literacy 89.85 10.15 100.00
primry1 74.56 25.44 100.00
primry2 68.85 31.15 100.00
secndry1 56.93 43.07 100.00
TVET1&2 56.90 43.10 100.00
secndry2 56.81 43.19 100.00
Diploma/TVET3 63.00 37.00 100.00
TVET4/above 67.49 32.51 100.00
Total 66.37 33.63 100.00
Note: All year pooled, youth. Economically active.
Table 2: Unemployment by education (%)
unemployed
education 0 1 Total
not answered 87.44 12.56 100.00
literacy 91.76 8.24 100.00
primary1 87.46 12.54 100.00
primary2 83.84 16.16 100.00
secondary1 76.30 23.70 100.00
TVET1&2 77.85 22.15 100.00
secondary2 79.83 20.17 100.00
Diploma/TVET3 85.02 14.98 100.00
TVET4&above 91.01 8.99 100.00
Total 83.30 16.70 100.00
Note: All year pooled, youth. Economically active.
Table 3: Summary statistics for family related variables
variable family mean std. sev. N
0 0.489 1.114 29526
family earning 1 1.599 1.238 22371
0.968 1.291 51897
0 0.039 0.199 29526
family TVET 1 0.145 0.326 22371
0.845 0.433 51897
0 1.196 1.197 29526
family edu 1 2.405 1.142 22371
1.717 1.267 51897
Note: Economically active, age 17-35, Sec1, TVET, Sec2.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for employment status by education
TVET
Lower secondary and TVET TVET and Upper secondary
unemployed 0 1 total 0 1 total
0 23,381 4,945 28,326 4,945 11,897 16,842
1 7,261 1,407 8,668 1,407 3,006 4,413
total 30,642 6,352 36,994 6,352 14,903 21,255
bad job 0 1 total 0 1 total
0 21,268 5,272 26,540 5,272 10,429 15,701
1 9,374 1,080 10,454 1,080 4,474 5,554
total 30,642 6,352 36,994 6,352 14,903 21,255
good job 0 1 total 0 1 total
0 16,635 2,487 19,122 2,487 7,480 9,967
1 14,007 3,865 17,872 3,865 7,423 11,288
total 30,642 6,352 36,994 6,352 14,903 21,255
Note:Youth, age 17-35, economically active only.
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Table 5: Probit on family membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep var=family membership
age -0.097*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.093***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
unemployed 0.414*** 0.418***
[0.009] [0.009]
edu noanswer -0.300*** -0.274*** -0.296*** -0.270***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
edu literacy -0.455*** -0.424*** -0.454*** -0.422***
[0.081] [0.081] [0.081] [0.081]
edu pri1 -0.205*** -0.183*** -0.203*** -0.181***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
edu sec1 0.261*** 0.235*** 0.282*** 0.265***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013]
edu TVET1&2 0.295*** 0.283*** 0.313*** 0.293***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.024] [0.025]
edu sec2 0.514*** 0.495*** 0.507*** 0.491***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017]
edu diploma TVET3 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.298*** 0.290***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016]
edu TVET4&avobe 0.209*** 0.227*** 0.092*** 0.102***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.018]
female -0.106*** -0.147*** -0.123*** -0.164***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
female sec1 -0.048*** -0.067***
[0.018] [0.019]
female diploma TVET3 0.022 0.042*
[0.022] [0.023]
female TVET4&avobe 0.354*** 0.380***
[0.029] [0.029]
r Addis 0.353*** 0.361*** 0.350*** 0.358***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
cons 2.277*** 2.107*** 2.287*** 2.115***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
pseudo R2 0.148 0.158 0.149 0.159
N 161891 161891 161891 161891
Note: Base education is upper secondary. Region and year dummies are included.
Insignificant cross terms with female not reported. All education level, economically active youth.
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Table 6: Benchmark Probit, Youth, Lower secondary and TVET
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job
TVET 0.047 0.044 0.040 0.066* 0.009 -0.406*** -0.406*** -0.403*** -0.303*** -0.482*** 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.166*** 0.440***
[0.029] [0.030] [0.030] [0.038] [0.052] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.043] [0.037] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.037] [0.036]
female 0.418*** 0.473*** 0.397*** 0.229*** 0.718*** -0.215*** -0.233*** -0.193*** -0.356*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.130*** 0.042* -0.281***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.023] [0.026] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.026] [0.021] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.020]
fe TVET -0.238*** -0.244*** -0.246*** -0.194*** -0.273*** -0.073* -0.071* -0.070* 0.086 -0.143*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.189*** 0.075 0.241***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.055] [0.064] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.066] [0.054] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.053] [0.049]
family 0.501*** -0.265*** -0.154***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.014]
f earning 0.060*** -0.034*** 0.062*** -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.051*** 0.005 0.062*** -0.000
[0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.010] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006]
age -0.062*** -0.047*** -0.062*** -0.042*** -0.048*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
cons 0.986*** 0.244*** 0.907*** 0.849*** 0.026 -1.479*** -1.105*** -1.385*** -1.462*** -1.003*** -0.578*** -0.354*** -0.599*** -0.843*** -0.078
[0.063] [0.068] [0.064] [0.086] [0.106] [0.062] [0.066] [0.063] [0.097] [0.089] [0.056] [0.060] [0.057] [0.083] [0.085]
family membership yes no yes no yes no
chi2 3108.941 4074.169 3210.476 635.573 1935.321 2060.858 2345.929 2172.472 795.230 1019.261 1022.449 1135.420 1031.175 375.974 901.026
r2 p 0.077 0.101 0.081 0.031 0.111 0.047 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.039 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.01 7 0.032
N 36994 36994 36305 15934 20371 36994 36994 36305 15934 20371 36994 36994 36305 15934 20371
Note: Region and year dummies are included.
Table 7: Benchmark Probit, Youth, TVET and Upper secondary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job
TVET -0.022 0.007 -0.018 0.051 -0.039 -0.379*** -0.393*** -0.385*** -0.331*** -0.440*** 0.336*** 0.326*** 0.335*** 0.208*** 0.438***
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.044] [0.059] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.048] [0.042] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.042] [0.040]
female 0.392*** 0.433*** 0.385*** 0.172*** 0.721*** -0.245*** -0.254*** -0.231*** -0.383*** -0.149*** -0.056*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 0.136*** -0.231***
[0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.034] [0.038] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.037] [0.030] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.032] [0.029]
fe TVET -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.228*** -0.136** -0.270*** -0.052 -0.055 -0.040 0.108 -0.137** 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.126*** -0.0 19 0.196***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.061] [0.070] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.071] [0.058] [0.038] [0.039] [0.039] [0.058] [0.053]
family 0.483*** -0.189*** -0.188***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.019]
f earning 0.035*** -0.070*** 0.049*** -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.063*** 0.027*** 0.090*** 0.020**
[0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009]
age -0.067*** -0.051*** -0.066*** -0.048*** -0.055*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.015***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
cons 1.085*** 0.362*** 1.038*** 0.949*** 0.282** -1.469*** -1.193*** -1.364*** -1.466*** -1.089*** -0.657*** -0.375*** -0.717*** -0.891*** -0.135
[0.086] [0.092] [0.087] [0.117] [0.144] [0.084] [0.090] [0.086] [0.130] [0.122] [0.076] [0.081] [0.077] [0.111] [0.114]
family membership yes no yes no yes no
chi2 1601.190 2085.530 1616.288 427.126 932.275 1299.307 1380.427 1372.374 537.031 744.142 765.295 861.898 784.743 316.456 645.592
r2 p 0.074 0.096 0.075 0.038 0.102 0.053 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.052 0.026 0.029 0.027 0.02 5 0.040
N 21255 21255 20939 9175 11764 21255 21255 20939 9175 11764 21255 21255 20939 9175 11764
Note: Region and year dummies are included.
Table 8: 2step Probit/2SLS with sample selection, Lower secondary and TVET
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job 1st step 2nd step
ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS family f earning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
main
TVET 0.052 0.018 -0.281*** -0.082*** 0.165*** 0.065*** -0.170*** 0.166***
[0.044] [0.016] [0.050] [0.014] [0.043] [0.016] [0.035] [0.035]
female 0.247*** 0.090*** -0.305*** -0.087*** -0.008 -0.002 -0.163*** 0.068***
[0.026] [0.009] [0.029] [0.008] [0.026] [0.010] [0.020] [0.022]
fe TVET -0.226*** -0.081*** 0.052 0.031* 0.129** 0.049** -0.011 -0.027
[0.061] [0.022] [0.072] [0.019] [0.059] [0.023] [0.048] [0.051]
f earning -0.083 -0.031 -0.134 -0.032 0.165** 0.063**
[0.079] [0.028] [0.093] [0.025] [0.078] [0.030]
age -0.049*** -0.017*** 0.028*** 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.009*** -0.060*** -0.006**
[0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
family edu 0.770***
[0.008]
married -2.078***
[0.024]
IMR1 0.000***
[0.000]
feHHH -0.077***
[0.020]
n siblings -0.073***
[0.006]
cons 1.066*** 0.874*** -1.336*** 0.060 -1.131*** 0.066 1.071*** 1.841***
[0.154] [0.055] [0.178] [0.048] [0.151] [0.058] [0.078] [0.083]
chi2 538.408 576.680 282.024 25512.248
r2 a 0.044 0.046 0.029 0.043
N 12858 12858 12858 12858 12858 12858 36994 12858
Note: Region and year dummies are included. Sample restricted to family=1 except for (7).
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Table 9: 2step Probit/2SLS with sample selection, TVET and upper secondary
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job 1st step 2nd step
ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS family f earning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TVET -0.005 -0.004 -0.355*** -0.104*** 0.300*** 0.108*** -0.246*** 0.146***
[0.053] [0.018] [0.057] [0.016] [0.058] [0.020] [0.039] [0.041]
female 0.149*** 0.050*** -0.390*** -0.114*** 0.171*** 0.064*** -0.177*** 0.040
[0.038] [0.013] [0.041] [0.011] [0.040] [0.015] [0.029] [0.032]
fe TVET -0.130* -0.041* 0.124 0.054*** -0.034 -0.013 0.038 -0.006
[0.068] [0.023] [0.078] [0.020] [0.072] [0.026] [0.051] [0.057]
family earning 0.188 0.070 0.168 0.049 -0.449** -0.119**
[0.151] [0.052] [0.149] [0.045] [0.198] [0.058]
age -0.046*** -0.016*** 0.032*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.007*** -0.058*** -0.007**
[0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
family edu 0.654***
[0.010]
married -2.038***
[0.029]
IMR2 0.001***
[0.000]
feHHH -0.038
[0.027]
n siblings -0.001
[0.007]
cons 0.582** 0.676*** -1.872*** -0.080 -0.002 0.404*** 1.245*** 1.686***
[0.294] [0.101] [0.299] [0.088] [0.372] [0.114] [0.104] [0.113]
chi2 297.065 413.343 166.127 14999.376
r2 a . 0.023 . 0.032
N 7693 7693 7693 7693 7693 7693 21255 7693
Note: Region and year dummies are included. Sample restricted to family=1 except for (7).
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Table 10: 2step Probit/2SLS, Youth, Sec1 and TVET
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job 1st step
ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS f earning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TVET 0.008 0.001 -0.403*** -0.129*** 0.330*** 0.128*** 0.046*
[0.030] [0.008] [0.028] [0.008] [0.026] [0.010] [0.024]
female 0.347*** 0.099*** -0.192*** -0.064*** -0.088*** -0.035*** 0.225***
[0.017] [0.005] [0.016] [0.005] [0.015] [0.006] [0.014]
fe TVET -0.251*** -0.078*** -0.070* 0.003 0.192*** 0.075*** -0.010
[0.041] [0.011] [0.042] [0.011] [0.036] [0.014] [0.033]
family earning 0.232*** 0.067*** -0.066*** -0.020*** -0.122*** -0.048***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.011] [0.003] [0.010] [0.004]
age -0.057*** -0.015*** 0.031*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.005*** -0.024***
[0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
n extendedF -0.272***
[0.012]
family edu 0.558***
[0.005]
cons 0.621*** 0.623*** -1.380*** 0.028 -0.392*** 0.349*** 0.792***
[0.067] [0.020] [0.065] [0.020] [0.060] [0.023] [0.054]
chi2 3103.641 3836.279 1948.875 2385.026 1129.827 1288.704
r2 0.057 0.057 0.010 0.273
N 36305 36305 36305 36305 36305 36305 36305
Note: Region and year dummies are included.
Table 11: 2step Probit/2SLS, Youth, TVET and Upper Secondary
Unemployed Bad Job Good Job 1st step
ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS ivprobit 2SLS f earning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TVET -0.031 -0.010 -0.389*** -0.123*** 0.349*** 0.133*** 0.096***
[0.034] [0.008] [0.032] [0.009] [0.029] [0.011] [0.025]
female 0.345*** 0.089*** -0.247*** -0.081*** -0.019 -0.008 0.162***
[0.025] [0.007] [0.023] [0.008] [0.022] [0.009] [0.019]
fe TVET -0.237*** -0.063*** -0.044 0.010 0.136*** 0.053*** 0.058*
[0.045] [0.012] [0.045] [0.012] [0.040] [0.015] [0.035]
family earning 0.185*** 0.051*** -0.009 -0.001 -0.128*** -0.049***
[0.015] [0.004] [0.014] [0.004] [0.013] [0.005]
age -0.062*** -0.017*** 0.026*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.008*** -0.021***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
n extendedF -0.138***
[0.013]
family edu 0.546***
[0.006]
cons 0.773*** 0.654*** -1.459*** 0.013 -0.449*** 0.333*** 0.695***
[0.091] [0.026] [0.089] [0.026] [0.081] [0.031] [0.070]
chi2 1561.179 1857.475 1209.539 1435.523 805.192 1012.222
r2 a 0.053 0.058 0.010 0.304
N 20939 20939 20939 20939 20939 20939 20939
Note: Region and year dummies are included.
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Table 12: Bivariate Probit
Lower secondary and TVET TVET and Upper secondary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
biprob U biprob BJ biprob GJ biprob U biprob BJ biprob GJ
TVET 0.913*** -0.250 -0.621*** 0.918*** 0.180 -0.853***
[0.179] [0.180] [0.166] [0.159] [0.165] [0.144]
female 0.395*** -0.166*** -0.142*** 0.374*** -0.225*** -0.065***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022]
female TVET -0.252*** -0.091** 0.228*** -0.237*** -0.066 0.171***
[0.041] [0.042] [0.037] [0.045] [0.045] [0.040]
family earning 0.016** -0.060*** 0.042*** -0.022** -0.102*** 0.103***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010]
family edu 0.132*** -0.005 -0.093*** 0.123*** 0.053*** -0.131***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
age -0.058*** 0.034*** 0.010*** -0.054*** 0.027*** 0.015***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
cons 0.620*** -1.379*** -0.344*** 0.506*** -1.479*** -0.227*
[0.069] [0.071] [0.061] [0.145] [0.159] [0.133]
TVET age -0.031*** -0.028*** 0.049*** -0.030*** -0.026*** 0.047***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
TVET family earning -0.033** 0.017 0.005 0.001 0.051*** -0.049***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.015] [0.018] [0.019] [0.017]
TVET family edu -0.033* 0.057*** -0.022 -0.019 -0.023 0.023
[0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.019] [0.020] [0.017]
TVET
female 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.131***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
family earning 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
family edu 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.089***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
family TVET 0.596*** 0.595*** 0.596*** 0.568*** 0.569*** 0.568***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
age 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
cons -1.195*** -1.195*** -1.198*** 1.754*** 1.750*** 1.749***
[0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.085] [0.085] [0.085]
athrho -0.014 0.273*** -0.143** -0.085 0.074 -0.016
[0.065] [0.078] [0.063] [0.070] [0.079] [0.065]
chi2 4509.371 3430.200 2222.452 5810.766 5315.842 4885.136
N 36305 36305 36305 20939 20939 20939
Note: Region and year dummies are included. athrho is arc hyperbolic tangent ρ.
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